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Abstract
This article presents and discusses the state of the art in political science 
research on welfare state reform. While scholars first aimed at explaining the 
emergence and growth of the welfare state, national variation in its develop-
ment, and crises of welfare state regimes, more recently the focus has shifted 
to the persistence and reform of the major welfare state institutions. Research 
in this direction has typically adopted an institutionalist perspective, stress-
ing how institutional settings affect the feasibility and direction of reforms. 
These studies have shed light on important aspects of the question, in par-
ticular by demonstrating the role of path dependency and veto players in 
reform processes, but suffer from two main problems, namely the difficulty 
of defining the dependent variable in an appropriate way, and the neglect of 
the importance of power resources.
Keywords: Welfare state, social policy, reform, institutional analysis, comparative 
politics
Introduction
The immense scholarly work on the welfare state is characterized by a wide vari-
ety of theoretical and empirical schools and explanatory objectives. There are, 
of course, many possible ways to classify these literatures. The “welfare state” 
is a generic term under which many definitions, theories, operationalizations 
and research accents are subsumed. Economists and sociologists have primarily 
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looked at the welfare state as an independent variable. This implied that the main 
research interest concerned the extent to which and the conditions under which 
welfare state programmes explain specific social and economic outcomes, such 
as equality, employment, and labour market behaviour.
To the extent that the topic has attracted the attention of political scientist at 
all, their interests has mostly been in the welfare state as a dependent variable, 
especially focusing on the political causes of welfare state development and 
cross-national variation. At present, the research attention has shifted to wel-
fare state reform, a concept around which there is considerable theoretical and 
empirical confusion and, accordingly, scholarly debate. As the welfare state is 
almost exclusively studied as a dependent variable in political science analyses, it 
may be helpful in this review to try to order the various approaches according to 
the type of explanatory problem they address. 
For this purpose, one can distinguish three types of mainstream theories, 
dealing with the causes of 1) the emergence, expansion and cross-national 
variation of welfare state regimes, 2) the “crisis” of the welfare state and 3) the 
political and institutional resilience of social policy arrangements. This clas-
sification not only does justice to the historical development of welfare state 
research, but also provides an accurate theoretical context for appreciating 
recent developments. In the light of the mounting social, economic and finan-
cial predicament of the welfare state, the problem of political and institutional 
“stickiness” of welfare regimes has become the dominant explanatory prob-
lem in research. Institutionalist approaches have moved to the forefront of the 
scholarly debate, but encounter difficulties understanding the type of policy 
changes and reforms that do occur.
The evolution of explanatory issues
There is large and varied body of literature that initially aimed at explaining the 
emergence and growth of the welfare state and later also tried to account for the cross-
national variation in development of advanced welfare regimes. Here we find comprehen-
sive theoretical attempts to understand the rise and expansion of the welfare state as 
an effect and feature, particularly of a) the modernization of society (e.g. Flora and 
Heidenheimer 1981), b) the evolution of industrial society (e.g. Wilensky and Leb-
eaux 1958; Wilensky 1975), and c) the contradictions of capitalism (e.g. Offe 1984). 
In addition, a long research tradition exists that has been studying the similarities 
and differences between advanced welfare states, explaining variation, for instance, 
in terms of demographic structure (e.g. Pampel and Williamson 1989), democratic 
institutionalization (e.g. Hewitt 1977), the power resources of political actors (e.g. 
Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990), and state structures (e.g. Skocpol 1992).
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There is also a large body of research that has focused on several crises of the 
welfare state. Increasingly the welfare state was viewed as an achievement which 
had grown to its limits (e.g. Flora 1986–87). Marxist analyses stressed that the 
redistributive logic of the welfare state contradicted the generic logic of capital-
ism governed by the functional needs of profitability and accumulation, and that 
this contradiction posed a threat to legitimacy and would necessarily lead to the 
breakdown of the welfare state (e.g. O’Connor 1973; Gough 1979; Offe 1984). In 
the wake of the oil crises and the conservative and neoliberal governments in the 
United States and the United Kingdom a host of crisis theories emerged, predict-
ing the dismantling of the welfare state as the embodiment of the ideal of equal-
ity (OECD 1981; Mishra 1984). More recently, crisis theories were constructed 
that focus on the increasing interdependence, internationalization or globaliza-
tion of national economies. These crisis theories stress that macro-processes such 
as globalization force welfare states to retrench radically and recommodify their 
social systems for reasons of international competitiveness. Different national 
systems are predicted to be rapidly converging around a lowest common social 
denominator (for a critical overview see Swank 2002). A similar account is given 
of the effects of European integration. The member states of the European Union 
(EU) abandon their internal borders, as a result of which the welfare systems 
need to be adjusted in a struggle for survival in a common market that is charac-
terized by the risk of tax competition and “social dumping”.
Many a theory predicted the end of the welfare state, particularly pointing to 
the formidable challenges and pressures that threaten its viability or even sub-
sistence. The challenges include population aging, sluggish economic growth, 
long-term unemployment, changing family structures, the transformation of life 
cycle patterns, the postindustrialization of labour markets, the erosion of sys-
tems of interest intermediation and collective bargaining, the rise of new risks 
and needs, and international pressures (“globalization”) (see for a particularly 
enlightening overview Schwartz 2001). However, empirical reality contradicted 
these theories since the welfare state has continued to exist, albeit perhaps func-
tioning at a lower level of social and economic performance (Kuhnle 2000).
This clash between theory and empirical reality gave rise to new theories 
with substantially different aims. Since the early 1990s, then, a new direction in 
welfare state research has documented empirically that welfare states have been 
remarkably resistant to change notwithstanding the mounting challenges they 
face. Rather than growth, variation, crisis or breakdown, the major explanatory 
problem for these dominant welfare state theories became the persistence of the 
major institutions of the welfare state. In accordance with mainstream political sci-
ence, institutionalist inspired theories identified crucial mechanisms (e.g., path 
dependency and lock-in) that explain welfare state persistence. Moreover, a 
major prediction of this body of literature became that these mechanisms also 
4 KEES VAN KERSBERGEN THE POLITICS OF WELFARE STATE REFORM 5
preclude the institutional transformation of welfare states in the next decade or 
so. Paul Pierson’s work (1994, 1996, 2001a) stands out here.
More than ever before, political scientist have joined economists, historians 
and sociologists in focusing on welfare state related issues. Currently, also politi-
cal science analyses almost exclusively focus on the welfare state as the depen-
dent variable, specifically trying to explain how and why existing welfare state 
regimes either seem to resist change – including the adjustments deemed neces-
sary for their own survival – or appear to change only gradually or incremen-
tally according to a built-in regime logic that seems to reaffirm if not aggravate 
the difficulties that are typical for the regime.
It is interesting yet somewhat peculiar in this context to observe that the wel-
fare state for a long time has been neglected somewhat by (comparative) political 
scientists other than those focusing on public policy in a more general sense (see 
extensively van Kersbergen and Becker 2002). Although the welfare state is by 
far the most important structural political transformation in postwar capitalist 
democracies, the contrast between the huge body of economic, sociological and 
public administration literature on the welfare state and the modest contribution 
of political science is striking.
There has been one major exception: the so-called “politics matters” school 
that in the late 1970s and 1980s opposed the banal theses, both in political science 
and in everyday political parlance, on the irrelevance of politics for economic 
and social outcomes. In the 1980s, this “politics matters” school (see Castles 
1982) time and again attempted to show that such simple and biased portrayals 
of politics were theoretical and ideological slogans rather than empirically valid 
statements. Frank G. Castles (1998: 27), probably the school’s most pronounced 
representative, summarized the issue: “This assertion of the consequential-
ity of politics was once extremely valuable as an anti-dote to the prevailing 
orthodoxy that policy was merely a function of socio-economic forces (…)”. The 
“politics matters” group concentrated on the political determinants of welfare 
state development. However, once a variety of studies had demonstrated party 
politics had an impact on, for instance, the level of social spending or the extent 
of social inequality in a society, the “politics matter” group fell apart, leaving 
welfare state issues to (political) sociologists, particularly those inspired by the 
power resources approach as advanced by the Swedish sociologist Walter Korpi 
(see his 1985 theoretical paper).
Precisely at the time that the former “politics matters” protagonists as well 
as the “power resources” theorists (see Castles 1998; Stephens et al. 1999; Huber 
and Stephens 2001a) increasingly conclude that politics in the “old” sense (class, 
parties, unions) matters less and less for welfare state development and out-
comes, welfare state issues have taken a much more prominent place on the 
research agenda of comparative political science (Pierson 1994, 1996, 2001a; see 
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Levy 1999). As Green-Pedersen and Haverland (2002; see van Kersbergen and 
Becker 2002) rightly stress, the debate on retrenchment and austerity, particu-
larly since the publication of Paul Pierson’s (1994) instant classic on the topic, 
has been almost entirely a political science affair. Arguments on how to explain 
retrenchment or the resilience of existing welfare regimes focus on “new” politi-
cal variables such as party systems, the logic of elections, political institutions, 
and political learning. It is important to stress that the explanatory problem has 
shifted from “growth”, “variation among advanced welfare state regimes” and 
“crisis” to the issue of the (theoretically) unexpected survival of the welfare state 
(see Kuhnle 2000; Pierson 2001a; Huber and Stephens 2001a; Swank 2002) and 
to the problem of understanding welfare state reform. “Underlining the severe 
pressures confronting mature welfare states does not, however, imply that the 
expected result is a collapse or radical retrenchment of national welfare states. 
Major policy reform is a political process, dependent on the mobilization of polit-
ical resources sufficient to overcome organized opponents and other barriers to 
change” (Pierson 2001b: 411, my emphasis). To understand major policy reform 
as a political process is political science’s current task.
New politics?
The first step in this direction was also taken by Pierson and a crucial debate 
has arisen fairly recently around his claim that the “old” politics of welfare state 
growth is radically different from the “new” politics of austerity. Major policy 
reform is difficult because of two major strengths of the welfare state: first, the 
broad electoral support for core social programmes and accordingly the political 
unpopularity of cutbacks; and second, the rigidity of welfare state institutions 
that results from path dependent development and veto points that have the 
capacity to obstruct reform. The issue is whether this entirely novel situation 
implies that the old theories of expansion, variation, and crises are obsolete and 
unusable for explaining retrenchment.
Paul Pierson (1996: 178), who analyzes retrenchment policies at the level of 
single programmes, has argued that “frontal assaults on the welfare state carry 
tremendous electoral risks” and that retrenchment as a political issue should not 
be misunderstood as the mirror image of the growth of the welfare state. Welfare 
expansion usually generated a popular politics of credit claiming for extending 
social rights and raising benefits to an increasing number of citizens, while aus-
terity policies affront voters and networks of organized interests.
The post-1945 welfare state has produced an entirely novel institutional con-
text. Once welfare programs, like social housing and health care, were solidly 
established, they created their own program specific constituencies of clients and 
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professional interests. As a consequence, “the emergence of powerful groups 
surrounding social programs may make the welfare state less dependent on the 
political parties, social movements, and labor organizations that expanded social 
programs in the first place” (Pierson 1996: 147). Specialized social programmes 
in the policy areas of social housing, health care, education, public assistance, 
social security, and labour market management have indeed developed into 
institutionally separated and functionally differentiated policy domains. There-
fore, a general weakening of social democratic and Christian democratic parties 
and the trade union movement – the main historical supporters of welfare state 
expansion – need not translate into a corresponding weakening of social policy. 
In his later work, Pierson (2001b: 428) stresses that different welfare regimes 
constitute different settings for the “new politics” of welfare state reform, and 
recognizes that as a result of this he may have underestimated the continuing 
political salience for welfare state politics of organized labour in some regimes.
Still, supported by strong popular attachments to specific policies, profes-
sional policy networks are able to muster substantial veto powers against reform 
efforts. Moreover, given the political salience and popularity of social policy, it is 
not easy to turn a political preference of “dismantling the welfare state” into an 
electorally attractive proposition. Shifting the goals from expansion to retrench-
ment imposes “tangible losses on concentrated groups of voters in return for 
diffuse and uncertain gains” (Pierson 1996: 145). On average, “retrenchment 
advocates thus confront a clash between their policy preferences and their elec-
toral ambitions” (Pierson 1996: 146).
A number of researchers have contributed to Pierson’s general line of 
research by adding to or refining the argument, for instance by stressing the role 
of coalition politics (Bonoli 2000), the potential and risks of concentrated politi-
cal power (e.g. in France, Great Britain and Switzerland; Bonoli 2001), by look-
ing at the particular institutional configuration that determines retrenchment 
(Swank 2001) or the domestic institutional “refraction” of international pres-
sures (Kitschelt et al. 1999), by highlighting the effect of the party system, party 
competition and party strategy (Levy 1999; Ross 2000; Green-Pedersen 2001; 
Kitschelt 2001), and by pointing to framing and the role of discourse to overcome 
electoral and institutional resistance to major policy reform (Cox 2001; Schmidt 
2000; a good overview is provided by Green-Pedersen and Haverland 2002). 
The former “politics matters” researchers as well as those who adhere to the 
“power resources approach” (Huber and Stephens 2001a, b) empirically corrob-
orate the Pierson-thesis and conclude that for austerity and retrenchment (public 
employment in Scandinavia is the exception) class and politics matter less and 
less, because an institutional rather than a political logic governs the adapta-
tion of welfare states. Huber and Stephens (2001a), however, have amended 
the more crude versions of the path dependency argument by pointing to the 
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importance of the so-called ratchet effect. This effect points to the phenomenon 
that once established social policies quickly gain momentum and that popular 
support has tended to increase after social programmes have been introduced. 
As a result, the mass opposition against retrenchment, particularly of pension, 
education and health care programmes, is generally much stronger than the sup-
port for their introduction tended to be.
It is also because of path dependency, the ratchet effect and other not strictly 
political mechanisms that Myles and Quadagno (2002) have turned to the first, 
“pre-political” generation of research as a source of inspiration for understand-
ing current developments in welfare state restructuring. The “logic of industrial-
ism” approach, for instance, correctly stressed the causal primacy of industrial-
ization and argued that the welfare state was by and large the answer of society 
to the growing needs of its population. Industrialization created a demand for 
welfare by destroying the traditional bonds of kinship, family ties, and the 
guilds, which were the main institutions providing social security. The develop-
ment of industrial society brought along economic growth, urbanization, and 
demographic change.
Population aging, one of the correlates of industrialization, has clearly been 
a major factor governing recent welfare state retrenchment and restructuring. In 
this sense, old theory is still relevant. However, as Myles and Quadagno (2002: 
51) correctly argue, current change is as much economic and social as it is demo-
graphic, if only because of the existing massive institutional commitments to 
pensions. Postindustrial development, too, has a whole set of new “correlates”, 
of which the increasing labour market participation of women, the changing 
family structures and declining fertility rates are the most important ones (see 
Esping-Andersen 1999). Still, the “logic” of the argument is similar and the idea 
is that still much can be learned from old, pre-political theory.
The “logic of industrialism” approach stressed that rapid economic growth 
not only created the need for welfare state intervention, but also the resources 
to do so. Scarbrough (2000) has stressed that trends associated with industrial 
development (urbanization, individualization, changes in family structures, 
increasing reliance on wage labour) are still paramount and hence permanently 
reinforce needs or generate new demands. At the same time, affluence, contin-
ued (although slower) economic growth and the considerable administrative 
capacity of the state, still provide the resources and means for the welfare state. 
Interestingly enough, neither the quantitative comparisons nor the comparative 
case studies by Huber and Stephens (2001a) confirm the industrialism thesis. 
The difference between Scarbrough’s study and the Huber and Stephens book 
is probably explained by the fact that only the latter explicitly study population 
aging as an important correlate of industrialization. An important finding of 
Huber and Stephens, however, is that variation in social spending in advanced 
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welfare states cannot be explained by differences in the composition of the pop-
ulation. “It is clear”, Huber and Stephens (2001a: 335) argue, “that demographic 
factors, that is, dependency ratios that turned unfavorable, have been and will 
continue to be challenges for welfare states. However, (…) dependency ratios 
depend not only on the relative size of different population groups, but also on 
the overall activity rates that vary greatly across countries”.
Scarbrough also points to the continued relevance of those theories that see 
the welfare state as an aspect of modernization and development, especially 
nation-building. Welfare states are still appropriate elite strategies of social and 
political incorporation and developments such as internationalization reinforce 
the threat of social exclusion. Her conclusion is that there are “good grounds 
for the presumption that state intervention to ensure some degree of security 
and equity among its citizens remains central to societal cohesion and political 
order” (Scarbrough 2000: 240). It is conspicuous that on this issue, political sci-
ence is relatively quiet.
Obviously, one could also make the argument that sluggish productivity 
growth and mass unemployment deteriorate the conditions for the maintenance 
of the welfare state or its further expansion and create an environment that is 
much more predisposed to welfare and tax backlash. Moreover, “postindustri-
alization”, i.e. the employment shift (and the accompanying change in the occu-
pational structure) from manufacturing to services, reinforces slow productivity 
growth. The point is that the “logic” of the argumentation is identical to the 
“logic of industrialism”.
In Esping-Andersen’s (1999) analyses, postindustrialism leads to serious 
trade-offs, particularly between protecting labour market insiders and creat-
ing opportunities for outsiders and, more generally, between employment and 
equality. The employment-equality problem stems from various sources. First, 
job growth must emerge from the (social and consumer) service sector, but this 
sector tends to produce low skilled or unskilled and therefore low-paid jobs. 
Second, the service sector lags behind the industrial sector in terms of productiv-
ity growth, resulting in a downward pressure on wages (or declining employ-
ment) in the former sector. Third, the rising supply of labour, especially of 
women, must largely be absorbed in the low paid, low skilled (personal, social) 
service sector, adding to the already downward pressure on wages and at the 
same time causing other problems and creating new risks (e.g. shortage of child 
care, low fertility rates). The fundamental dilemma seems to be that job growth 
in the service sector can only occur at the expense of rising inequality.
Iversen and Wren (1998) even identify a postindustrial trilemma between 
budgetary restraint, wage equality and employment growth, where only two of 
these three policy goals can be successfully pursued simultaneously. “Because 
budgetary restraint precludes any rapid expansion of public sector employment, 
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governments wedded to such discipline must either accept low earnings equal-
ity in order to spur growth in private service employment or face low growth 
in overall employment. Alternatively, governments may pursue earnings equal-
ity and high employment, but they can do so only at the expense of budgetary 
restraint” (Iversen and Wren 1998: 513). This is especially a problem for the wel-
fare states that are members of the EU, since they agreed to adhere to the stabil-
ity criteria of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that compel governments 
to strive for balanced budgets and in any case rule out budget deficits over 3 per 
cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
There is wide agreement that in the postwar period cross-national variation 
in welfare state development – under conditions of continuing industrial devel-
opment – could by and large be explained by the variation in class structure, 
class coalitions, the strength of political parties and unions as well as by the insti-
tutional setting in which these forces struggled. Huber and Stephens (2001a), in 
their masterful comparative and historical study of the development and crisis 
of postwar welfare states, show that political choice (influenced if not deter-
mined by the power of political parties, unions, and women’s organizations) has 
been essential for the formation of welfare state regimes. Political struggles have 
always taken place in the context of political institutions and choice has been 
shaped accordingly. Huber and Stephens (2001a: 317) demonstrate, for both 
expansion and retrenchment, that “constitutional provisions that concentrate 
power facilitated, and provisions that disperse power obstructed, the passing of 
major pieces of welfare state legislation”. 
The effects of power concentration are generally well documented in studies 
of welfare state reform in the United Kingdom and New Zealand (see on the UK: 
Pierson 1994; Rhodes 2000; see on New Zealand: Schwartz 2000). Switzerland is 
the case where the effects of the dispersion of power probably best explain the 
government’s limited capacity to introduce or reform social and economic policy 
at all. As Bonoli and Mach (2000: 166) accurately put it: 
“Institutional fragmentation among three distinct tiers of government, 
the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank, the 
important role played by the social partners in the regulation of the 
labor market, and the segmented character of state-society relationships 
– all these factors prevent the government from being able to coordinate 
initiatives undertaken in these different arenas of social and economic 
policy. Policy responses requiring intervention in a number of different 
areas are thus particularly difficult to implement. The result is that the 
degree of influence that politicians can hope to exert on the economy is 
more limited than in most other European countries”. 
This is not to argue that reforms are impossible (see Bonoli 1999), but that they 
are difficult. In fact, the existence of multiple veto points in the legislative pro-
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cess, particularly referendums, reinforces this relative political powerlessness, 
currently curtailing and slowing down the process of policy reform in Switzer-
land, albeit with variation in different policy areas.
For this and comparable reasons, there is growing consensus among research 
(Hicks 1999; Stephens et al. 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001a, b; Swank 2002) 
who argue that “politics matters” in a very different way (or not at all) for how 
welfare states cope with the contemporary challenges, especially the postindus-
trialization of labour markets and economic internationalization. As Myles and 
Quadagno (2002: 52) put it: 
“Political accounts of the earlier period of post-war expansion – the 
claim that politics matters – emphasized the role of political actors (…). 
In contrast, explanations of refracted divergence during the last quarter 
century – the variety of responses to globalization and postindustrialization 
– have instead emphasized the decisive role of political institutions (…): 
thus the partisan (left-right) composition of government matters less than 
the presence of corporatist decision-making institutions”.
In general, those who argue that the old political theory that was designed to 
explain the expansion of the welfare state cannot explain retrenchment and 
restructuring, frequently revert to either old theories that preceded the “poli-
tics matters” school, particularly the “logic of industrialism” approach and 
elite-oriented modernization (nation-building) theory, but also – although 
here I will not elaborate this – Marxist analyses of the capitalist state (this 
holds particularly for much of the globalization literature, see e.g. Boyer and 
Drache 1996) or institutional arguments that clarify the difficulties of reform. 
However, there is a slight risk that with the revival of “old” theory researchers 
will repeat “old mistakes” too.
Institutionalism and the dependent variable problem
Quantitatively oriented studies have tended to equate welfare state expan-
sion with increasing social spending, usually expressed as some percentage of 
GDP. It was, of course, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) respecification of the depen-
dent variable that radically changed all this. Starting from the judgement that 
“expenditures are epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of welfare states” 
(1990: 19) and the reflection that “it is difficult to imagine that anyone struggled 
for spending per se” (1990: 21), he suggested that the study of welfare states 
had much to gain by looking at the quality of social rights, the typical patterns 
of stratification, and the manner in which the state, the market and the family 
interacted in the production of work and social welfare. In this way, Esping-
Andersen was able to distinguish three types of welfare state regimes (social 
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democratic, liberal and corporatist or conservative) which differed with respect 
to the major institutions guaranteeing social security (the state, the market or 
the family); the kind of stratification systems upheld by the institutional mix 
of these institutions (the extent of status and class differentiation, segmentation 
and inequality typically implied in social security systems); and the degree of 
decommodification, that is to say “the degree to which individuals, or families, 
can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market 
participation” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 37).
Sometimes the choice for adopting a narrow understanding of the welfare 
state as social security and neglecting social services is justified by stressing that 
transfer payments are at the heart of the welfare state. However, much of the 
retrenchment literature has shown a continuous tendency to relapse into the 
pre-Esping-Andersen expenditure oriented specification of the welfare state as 
the dependent variable. Occasionally, therefore, unwarranted regression into a 
theoretical underspecification of the dependent variable leads to empirical–ana-
lytical fallacies or inconsistencies.
It is worthwhile to elaborate this issue somewhat further. Goodin et al.’s 
(1999) innovative and stimulating study of the “real worlds of welfare” focuses 
on what difference it makes under what type of welfare state regime individuals 
actually live. Its central finding is that the “social democratic welfare regime”, 
exemplified by the Netherlands, is superior to all other regimes, not only if one 
assesses outcomes measured against the regime’s own goals, but also if one 
looks at the goals set internally by the liberal (United States) or corporatist (Ger-
many) welfare regimes. It turns out that the “social democratic welfare regime” 
simply outperforms the other regimes even on their own grounds, both socially 
(poverty, equality, social integration and stability, autonomy) and economically 
(efficiency). “Thus, no matter which of the goals you set for your welfare regime, 
the social democratic model is at least as good as (and typically better than) any 
other for attaining it” (Goodin et al. 1999: 260).
The study’s major weakness concerns its rather narrow operationalization of 
the critical regime concept only in terms of public transfers, which, in fact, con-
tradicts the very theoretical purpose of the regime concept itself. The regime con-
cept was originally meant to move away from the public spending bias in much 
welfare state research and to focus on theoretically less epiphenomenal features 
such as the state–market–family mix in a nation’s search for work and welfare, 
social stratification, the institutional accommodation to full employment and, of 
course, decommodification. Goodin et al. (1999) seem to forget the theoretical 
point and narrow the regime concept to decommodifcation. As a result, their 
operationalization of a welfare regime is solely done in terms of public transfers. 
It is this theoretical and empirical contraction of the regime concept that also 
explains why the Netherlands can be defended as the archetypical social demo-
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cratic welfare state, because the Dutch welfare state is indeed a transfer-state par 
excellence. But why are (generous) transfers a typical social democratic feature? 
This choice is not justified theoretically. In fact, the single most consequential 
choice of the study is to look at the tax-transfer aspects of countries’ welfare 
regimes rather than at other equally important regime characteristics. Although 
issues of typologies and classification remain highly controversial (see Arts and 
Gelissen 2002), it is only because of this, that the Dutch welfare state could be 
portrayed as the archetypical social democratic welfare state, where other stud-
ies (e.g. van Kersbergen 1995; Huber and Stephens 2001a) would classify the 
Netherlands either as a Christian democratic or at most a hybrid welfare state 
(on the Dutch welfare state, see Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Hemerijck, Unger 
and Visser 2000).
There is, also in a more general sense, an interesting parallel between the 
expansion literature and the retrenchment and reform literature as both have 
struggled with the problem of how to define and operationalize the dependent 
variable. Theoretically, there is confusion around the question “what is to be 
explained”? Is it the crisis or end of the welfare state? Is it cross-national varia-
tion in the patterns of retrenchment? Is it the reconstruction of the welfare state? 
Is it the persistence of welfare states? Is it the convergence of regimes?
Pierson (2001b) observes that there is a lack of consensus on outcomes, 
particularly with respect to the issue of how much welfare states have actu-
ally changed since the Golden Age of growth, that is to say roughly since the 
1980s. For instance, where Pierson (1996) looks at social spending, particularly 
transfer payments, and concludes that there has been no radical dismantling of 
welfare state arrangements, Clayton and Pontusson (1998) criticize this thesis by 
pointing to the fact that if one looks at the organization of the public sector, par-
ticularly the delivery of social services and the development of public employ-
ment, one can observe significant retrenchments and strongly market-oriented 
reforms, even in the social democratic welfare state of Sweden. In fact, Clayton 
and Pontusson go so far as to argue that current reforms (retrenchment) tend to 
have an anti-service bias which is not picked up if one studies transfer payments 
only. By contrast, Levy (1999) finds that especially welfare state reform in Chris-
tian democratic regimes cannot be described either in terms of pure retrench-
ments of transfer programs or in terms of an anti-service bias (if only because 
these welfare states are service-lean anyway). His argument is that these welfare 
states “are not locked into zero-sum trade-offs between the pursuit of efficiency 
and the pursuit of equity” (Levy, 1999: 265). In fact, successful reform implies 
turning vice into virtue, that is, “targeting inequities within the welfare system 
that are simultaneously a source of inefficiency” (idem).
According to Pierson (2001b), the controversy over the dependent variable is 
first of all a result of the indistinctness of the concept of the welfare state itself. 
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Too many and quite divergent phenomena are discussed under the same head-
ing. In other words, contemporary welfare state research suffers from a weak-
ness well known in comparative politics: concept stretching. Related to this 
is the problem of which data to use for the operationalization of “the welfare 
state”. Also, most theories so far are still based on the analysis of data of the 
early 1990s, whereas the most significant changes may be of more recent date 
(van Kersbergen 2000). Finally, Pierson also notices theoretical weaknesses that 
concern the implicit assumption in many studies that one can measure welfare 
state change along a single scale. He observes that there has been a tendency to 
reduce the problem of welfare state retrenchment and reform to a dichotomy 
of “less” versus “more” and “intact” versus “dismantled”, which is an unwar-
ranted theoretical simplification. He proposes to emend this and improve our 
understanding of welfare state change by looking at three dimensions: 
(1)Recommodification: the attempt “to restrict the alternatives to 
participation in the labour market, either by tightening eligibility or cutting 
benefits” (Pierson 2001b: 422), that is to say strengthening the whip of the 
labour market;
(2)Cost containment: the attempt to keep balanced budgets through 
austerity policies, including deficit reduction and tax moderation;
(3)Recalibration: “reforms which seek to make contemporary welfare 
states more consistent with contemporary goals and demands for social 
provision” (Pierson 2001b: 425).
Obviously, as Pierson (2001b: 425) himself points out, this is “tricky territory ana-
lytically”, because it may be very hard to “distinguish the impact of new ideas 
about how to do things, or efforts to recalibrate errant programs, from simple 
cutbacks in provision”. The way to go about to try to solve the dependent vari-
able problem is 1) to make sense, both theoretically and empirically, of welfare 
state reform by carefully elucidating and documenting what kind of changes are 
taking place and 2) to explain cross-national variation in change along the vari-
ous dimensions of welfare state reform by trying to uncover the causal forces 
and mechanisms that drive these processes. In addition, path dependency argu-
ments need to take into account that there are different welfare state regimes, so 
that there are different paths of adjustment.
Making use of the strengths of the regime-approach as elaborated by Esping-
Andersen (1990, 1999) and the country and policy area studies he brought 
together in his edited volume, Pierson (2001b) infers that each regime (social 
democratic, liberal or conservative) is characterized by its own specific “new 
politics” of welfare state reform. So, in the liberal regime voters are less likely 
to be attached to the welfare state than in the conservative or social democratic 
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models. Recommodification is here the pivotal feature of welfare state reform. In 
the social democratic welfare regime, voters are highly attached to, and depen-
dent on, the welfare state. Recommodification is not so much on the political 
agenda of reform, but – if only because of the sheer size of the public sector 
– cost containment is. The conservative regime is probably the most ill-adapted 
model of the three worlds of welfare capitalism, as a result of which recalibration 
and cost containment are the two dimensions of reform that dominate. Here the 
issues are how to stimulate job growth in the underdeveloped service sector and 
how to contain the exploding costs of pensions, disability, and health.
Conclusion
Although Pierson has considerably improved our understanding of contempo-
rary welfare state development, not only by his specification of welfare state 
change, but also by bringing together a distinguished group of researchers for 
well investigated country and policy area studies, his analyses still suffer some-
what from a weakness that is inherent to the institutional approach. Institution-
alist analyses are very well capable of explaining institutional resilience, but have 
much more difficulties with understanding institutional and policy change. For a 
large part, this problem is caused by an exaggerated emphasis on institutions as 
rules of the game that seem to affect the political process of reform semi-autono-
mously and as if power does not matter.
There seems to be a growing awareness of this problem. Researchers have 
started to look for ways in which to make institutional, especially path depen-
dent analyses, much more dynamic and much more sensitive to the intricacies 
of politics and policy-making. Especially the underresearched issue of causal 
mechanisms connecting cause (e.g. pressures or challenges) and effect (e.g. wel-
fare state reform in whatever dimension) is attracting more and more attention. 
So, Hemerijck and Schludi (2000; see also Hemerijck and van Kersbergen 1999) 
focus on policy adjustment in terms of a trial and error of policy learning, where 
adjustment follows a sequential logic of various orders of change (changing 
policy instruments, policies, institutions, goals).
Another proposition concerns the role of discourse in policy change. “In 
order to succeed with unpopular reforms (…), governments must be able to 
dissociate the self-serving protest of disadvantaged interest groups from the 
support of the moral majority. This (…) can be achieved only through discourses 
that seek to demonstrate that reform is not only necessary, by giving good 
reasons for new policy initiatives, but also appropriate, through the appeal to 
values (…). (N)o major and initially unpopular welfare-state reform could suc-
ceed in the medium term if it did not also succeed in changing the underlying 
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definition of moral appropriateness” (Schmidt 2000: 231).
If institutionalist analyses do encounter their limits when trying to explain 
change or reform, it may make sense to return to a political sociology approach 
that stresses the importance of power resources, not just for understanding the 
development and crisis of the welfare state, the relevance of which Huber and 
Stephens (2001a) have demonstrated, but also for formulating new questions 
and hypotheses on welfare state reform that go beyond the issue of institutional 
resilience. Let me then simply conclude this review by formulating four fairly 
straightforward propositions. First, existing welfare institutions are the “con-
densation” of power relations prevailing at an earlier time. Second, at least part 
of the political power struggle over social policy reform is about how to put 
welfare institutions into action or about their transformation. Third, traditional 
politics is about defending those welfare institutions that are, and about block-
ing those welfare state reforms that are not, beneficial to established positions 
of power. Finally, the “new politics” of welfare state reform is about attempting 
to reform the welfare state in such a way that the reforms are simultaneously 
investments in future power resources. These propositions are an indication of 
the direction political science research on the welfare state could or should go.
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Die Politik der Wohlfahrtsstaatreform
Dieser Artikel präsentiert und diskutiert den aktuellen Kenntnisstand in der 
politikwissenschaftlichen Forschung über Wohlfahrtsstaatreformen. Wäh-
rend man anfangs versuchte, vor allem die Herausbildung und das Wachs-
tum von Wohlfahrtsstaaten zu verstehen, sowie die Unterschiede zwischen 
den Ländern bei der Entwicklung und die Krisen von Wohlfahrtsstaatregi-
men, konzentriert sich die neuere Forschung mehr auf die Langlebigkeit und 
Reformen der bedeutendsten wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Institutionen. Diese For-
schung verfolgt einen institutionalistischen Ansatz, aüber den der Einfluss 
der institutionellen Struktur auf Richtung und Möglichkeit von Reformen 
gemessen wird. Wichtige Gesichtspunkte sind auf diese Weise in den Vor-
dergrund gerückt worden wie zum Beispiel die Rolle der Pfadabhängigkeit 
und von Veto-Spielern in Reformprozessen. Trotzdem lassen sich zwei 
Probleme des institutionalistischen Ansatzes benennen: erstens, die Schwie-
rigkeit, die abhängige Variable in geeigneter Weise zu definieren und, zwei-
tens, die Vernachlässigung von Machtressourcen im Reformprozess.
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Les politiques de l’Etat-providence
Cet article présente et discute l’état de la recherche en science politique sur les 
réformes de l’Etat-providence. Alors que les chercheurs ont dans un premier 
temps cherché à expliquer l’émergence et la croissance de l’Etat-providence, 
les variations nationales et ses crises, l’attention s’est récemment portée sur 
la persistance et les réformes des institutions majeures de l’Etat-providence. 
Les recherches dans cette direction ont typiquement adopté une perspective 
néo-institutionnaliste, cherchant à comprendre comment les caractéristiques 
institutionnelles affectent la faisabilité et la direction des réformes. Ces 
études ont mis en lumière des aspects importants de la question, notamment 
en montrant le rôle des phénomènes de “dépendance de sentier” et des “veto 
players” dans les processus de réforme, mais ont souffert de deux problèmes 
principaux: la difficulté à définir une variable dépendante d’une manière 
appropriée et la négation de l’importance des ressources de pouvoir.
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